is article analyses, the complex relationship between Tehran, Beijing and Washington on the Iranian nuclear issue. Indeed, China's policy towards Iran has often been described as ambiguous, in supporting Washington, on the one hand, while protecting Tehran, on the other hand. In this article, we argue that, in fact, Beijing policy vis-a-vis Tehran depends on the state of its relationships with Washington. Indeed, a closer analysis shows that China is using Iran as a bargaining chip with the United States on, among others, two key security issues, i.e., Taiwan and the oil supply. e guarantee of a secured oil supply from the Middle-East in addition to a comprehensive policy of the US with regard to Chinese security interests in Taiwan as well as the use of smart sanctions against Tehran, which would thus take into account, to a certain extent, Beijing economic interests in Iran, are, indeed, the guarantee of Beijing's support to the US policy towards Iran.
Introduction
Since the beginning of the Iranian nuclear crisis in , the United States, the superpower, has always wanted to adopt a united front-gathering, under its leadership, the five most powerful nations 1 -in the face of what, according to the American administration, is Tehran's regime threat on international collective nuclear non-proliferation security. Yet, from the outbreak of the crisis, Washington has been confronted with the shilly-shallying of Moscow and vital interest as Taiwan and Xinjiang have combined to spark a new crisis with its neighbours, all allies of the United States, and have further increased this rivalry.
Iran, for its part, is also an important factor for China, to the extent that not only is it one of the most important world oil producers, but it is also the only oil-producing country in the Middle East that, far from being an ally of the United States, is actually its foe. In fact, one of the key bases of the Iranian revolution is the rejection of US domination-'the great Satan', according to Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of Iran's Islamic Republic. We should remember that, in the middle of the s, Hachemi Rafsanjani, then President of Iran, declared, 'We are who we are because of our revolution.' In this respect, opposition to the United States is a part of the Iranian leadership world view or, one might even say, Iranian identity. In this global context, keeping good relationships with Tehran is an important component in Beijing's Middle Eastern policy, particularly in the case of crisis between China and the US. Indeed, Tehran can always guarantee a regular flow of oil to Beijing, with no pressure from Washington. Yet during the last few years this situation has not prevented China from exerting a certain pressure on Iran, in order to make Iran renounce its nuclear programme. In this fight against proliferation, China has accepted tighter controls from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and regularly expressed its concern by voting for strong UN sanctions against Iran. In what follows, after a thorough analysis of the complex relationships between Washington and Beijing we will focus our analysis on two key factors which explain Chinese interactive international policy regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis. e first and more important, at least in the short term, is the oil factor and how it plays in Beijing policy in the current stand-off between Iran and the international community. e second, which is less well known and may be less key, while remaining extremely important, is the Taiwanese factor. We will see that, in fact, some guarantees from the US on the Taiwan issue and on regular oil supplies from the Middle East, coupled with 'smart' UN sanctions, have probably led Beijing to take a softer line on the Iranian issue.
. China and the United States
For Beijing, its huge and relatively recent development has made China 'a prosperous country' with 'a powerful army'.
4 Indeed, within a -year period, 4) Robert Kagan, e Return of History (New York: Alfred Knopf, ), p. .
China has evolved from the state of a poor country, torn by civil war, to that of a world military power, with secured borders, and an economy tending more and more to becoming one of the strongest in the world. 5 is explains why Western nations have kept trying to contain China's growing power by engaging Beijing, economically and diplomatically, in signing of a series of treaties, commercial conventions and international regimes.
6
As explained by Robert Kagan, this strategy seems to have worked in some aspects, since its dependency and implication in the world economy have led China to claim to be 'a responsible shareholder' of the global economic system and 'a cautious player' on the international stage. 7 erefore, within this framework China has been showing a greater and greater interest in the stability of the world economy and, more specifically, in that of the US, upon which China is heavily dependent.
8 It is true that the US is the leading importer of Chinese goods, whereas China ranks as the second importer of American goods. Just for information, the total volume of their trade rose to   billion in , while China, in spite of a current large trade deficit of around   billion, is a huge and growing market for US exports and investors (about   billion in ).
9 is is why good relations with the US stand as a priority for China. And it seems all the more important in that Beijing has to tolerate US control of vital communication channels, such as the Malacca Strait, through which China receives its oil supplies from the Middle East, supplies which are crucial for its economic growth.
10
erefore, for China the United States is not only a commercial partner but also a political rival, and one which should be sometimes mistrusted and even confronted. As a matter of fact, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Chinese clearly understood that in the new world order President George H.W. Bush wanted to impose a dominant America over a weakened Russia and China, i.e. to downgrade them as two secondary-ranking powers.
11 is led to several crises between China and the US. In this regard, we remember the face-off on Taiwan between Beijing and Washington in -, which resulted in the 5) Kagan 
12
Yet this does not necessarily mean that Sino-American relationships are totally in conflict: far from it. In fact, present Chinese foreign policy is based on the principle of 'a new concept of security' which was initiated during the s. is new approach implies that China acts as a responsible power on the international stage, while continuing its emergence peacefully.
13 More specifically, this new concept of security underlines the importance of a common security, since no country can maintain its own security at the expense of its neighbouring countries.
14 Moreover, it gives an extended definition of security, insisting on its multidimensional aspects, particularly in the field of human and/or economic security, added to the traditional concept of security. Finally, this concept states that security can be reached only by mutual trust and mutual benefits, as well as by equality and coordination between states.
15
Over the years China has shown rather mixed feelings regarding the fight against weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Indeed, during the s China was an active proliferator, passing sensitive technologies to several countries, among them Pakistan and Iran. However, since the beginning of the s Beijing has reversed its policy, joining all the international treaties and agreements related to arms non-proliferation.
16 It has also signed several agreements with the US, committing the country to very stringent obligations in this field.
17
In fact, several reasons may explain China's more constructive approach on the non-proliferation issue. First, Beijing would like to reduce the tensions in its external security environment, so as to better focus on its domestic challenges.
18 Indeed, it mostly seeks to reassure its neighbours concerning its peaceful emergence, while balancing its relationships with the US cautiously, in Bates, Rising Star, p. . order to reach its security objectives more efficiently.
19 Within this framework, both battles-against proliferation and in favour of armament control-are among China's priorities. 20 In this context, Beijing has actively supported the treaty to halt the production of fissile material and to reduce fissile stocks. Moreover, although it has not yet been ratified, China has also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTB), which considerably limits its capacity to develop new nuclear weapons.
21 In addition, it has stopped producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weaponised plutonium.
22
Besides this, in  China joined the American Container Security Initiative (CSI) authorising the presence of American observers in Chinese ports, a presence which would have been unthinkable a few years ago.
23
As an emerging world power, therefore, China has become not only a partner of choice for the US but also an unavoidable partner in the fight against arms proliferation. ose two aspects have been perfectly integrated by the Americans, since China is also an active member of the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean issue and a member of the Group of Six on the Iranian one. China's contribution has been put into action, several times leading Condoleezza Rice, then American Secretary of State, to praise its role in the North Korean case and furthermore to remind the world that China had shown no hesitation in joining UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea, a country which was, at that time, China's ally.
24 However, on the Iranian case, Beijing's position has been more complex.
. China and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis

.. Chinese Interests in the Region
For Beijing, Middle Eastern oil resources hold a key place in its economic development, and by extension its political and military power, which follows from it. Given that China consumed around . million barrels of oil per day 

in ,  per cent of which came from the Middle East, it is estimated that by  its consumption will double to . million barrels per day, of which  to  per cent will be coming from that same region.
25
erefore, even if China tries to diversify its foreign sources of oil imports, it is reasonable to expect that it remain dependent on Persian Gulf exports.
26
Yet we remember the tumultuous relationships of the s between China and the US, mainly concerning the Taiwan question. Chinese leaders at that time feared that the US would use its influence in the region to restrict China's access to Middle Eastern oil supplies.
27 is explains why today the Chinese want to make sure that the US, presently the dominant power in the region, will never use oil as a mean of pressure on their country. As stated by Erica Strecker Downs, 'e oil Chinese diplomacy in the Middle East is an effort aiming at a continued oil access in a region dominated by the US, and which provides most of its oil imports.' 28 erefore, in establishing strategic relations with the countries of that very region, Beijing would like to avoid the use of oil access as a means of exerting pressure against China. It is in this context that in  China and Saudi Arabia announced their signing of 'a strategic partnership' which was to increase China's imports of Saudi oil from , barrels per day in  to , barrels per day in .
29
Moreover, the Chinese have also established economic and security relations with a certain number of countries closely linked to the US, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and even Israel, which exports arms to China to a value of   billion.
30 ey are also keeping open relations with countries opposed to the US, like Syria and especially Iran, for which China is one of the few external sources of armaments. 
35
is clearly shows that Beijing perceives Islamic fundamentalism as a threat, and strengthening its ties with the Gulf nations is a way of preventing the influence of radical Islamists on its own Muslims.
Finally, the last element dictating Chinese policy in the Middle East is the Taiwan issue. As a matter of fact, Taiwan is trying to gain, particularly from the Gulf countries, an international recognition of its status as a political entity, separate from China. rough its Middle East policy, China has succeeded in freezing the establishment of relations between Taiwan and Saudi Arabia, and is still putting enormous effort into blocking any such Taiwanese attempt in the region.
We will now consider these key elements behind Chinese policy in the Middle East with particular regard to its special relations with Iran. 
.. Tehran-Beijing Relationships
Even though China and Iran had established diplomatic relations in the early s during the time of the shah, it was only after the Iranian revolution of  that the two countries became closer. Indeed, the technical military cooperation between China and Iran started at the very beginning of the s, when Iran was at war with Iraq. For many strategic, political and economic reasons, Beijing started selling large quantities of conventional weapons to Tehran.
36 Its sales of HY- Silkworm cruise missiles caused deep US concern, to such a point that President Reagan decided to freeze the export of American technology to China.
37 Finally, in March , Beijing ceased exporting missiles to Tehran. However, when in  Iran again tested the Chinese C anti-ship missile, the Clinton administration had to exert enormous pressure to force China to commit to not providing or selling any more Cs to Tehran.
38
Later on, during the first decade of , China remained a major exporter of conventional weapons to Iran, exporting anti-ship missiles such as the TL/ FL, very useful in challenging the strong US navy deployment in the Persian Gulf, as well as other submarine-launched missiles. Between  and , China supplanted Russia as the major weapon provider to Iran. However, a close look at the figures indicates that, between  and , China exported weapons to the value of  -  million a year, reaching a total for this period of   million.
39 In terms of military exports, these figures are extremely low. Moreover, the weapons were provided in small quantities, compared with other major export deals China had signed with other countries such as Pakistan. As Gill Bates explains:
China has, on the one hand, helped Iran in the development of its capacities of producing cruise and ballistic missiles, while providing, on the other hand, military science expertise as well as production technologies, plans and, possibly, an assistance in the development of a clandestine program for the production of nuclear and chemical weapons. For Tehran, given the international isolation in which it has been confined since the  revolution, this Chinese goodwill was an opportunity to be seized. Besides, its pariah status has made Iran an attractive market for the Chinese, who de facto became one of Iran's very few suppliers, not only of conventional weapons but also of WMD.
41 erefore, from  to  Chinese assistance to the Iran nuclear programme was indeed very decisive, making China Iran's main partner in this field. Above all, this was the way for Iran to bypass American restrictions on the armaments trade market.
42
It was in this context that China helped Tehran expand the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC), in providing the Centre with a small research nuclear reactor.
43 A year later, a memorandum was signed with Tehran whereby Beijing committed to ensuring the training of Iranian scientists, engineers and technicians, as well as to imparting knowledge related to the design and building of nuclear facilities especially intended for the conversion of uranium.
44
Yet the main Chinese contribution took place between  and , when Beijing, without informing the IAEA, sold Iran natural uranium, namely UF, which can be used to produce uranium metal, a substance particularly useful in a military programme.
45 Beijing has also contributed in building a complete facility for the conversion of uranium in Esfahan.
46 Yet, as is known, a facility for the conversion of uranium is generally composed of several lines, one of which allows concentrated uranium ore (CUO), better known as yellowcake, to be converted into uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ), which is a determining component in the making of a nuclear bomb.
47 Finally, China has also sold Iran a research reactor using beryllium and tritium, two substances enabling very useful tests for an atomic bomb. However, in , further to American pressure, China had to suspend its cooperation with Iran in the field of nuclear technology as well as its supply of missiles. 49 In fact, Beijing's suspension of cooperation with Iran might be explained by: () its desire to access American nuclear technology; () relentless American pressure, but also China's need to stabilise its relations with Washington; () China's desire to be recognised as a moderate and responsible power; and finally, () China's awareness that, as a nuclear power and, what is more, a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), its own interests would be better served by a restriction of the number of states possessing nuclear weapons.
48
Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, -
50
Nonetheless, China has never really ended its relationship with Iran, both countries showing their respective determination to continue their partnership. is can be justified by several reasons, among which is their shared feeling that the interference of Western nations in their internal affairs has significantly delayed their economic growth. However, there are other more strategic reasons. Indeed, China, like Iran, fears that US hegemony over this rich region with the world's largest oil and gas reserves would ensure that the US held the status of the dominant power.
51 In this regard, Beijing has over the years repeatedly proclaimed its preference for a multipolar rather than a unipolar world, a position which can only please Tehran. As a matter of fact, countering US hegemony in the region has been the main objective of Tehran's foreign policy since the early days of the revolution. Moreover, in this region from which China gets its oil imports, Iran could be its only ally in the event of a major clash with the US. Finally, a long-lasting crisis in the Middle East would force the US to divert major military resources to the region, thereby weakening the US presence in Asia and allowing China to further assert its position in this part of the world.
52
is explains China's important contributions, particularly to Iran's nuclear and military programmes until , as well as to the development of their trade relations, which rose from   million in  to  . billion in , reaching   billion in . Iran, on its side, sees China as an ally among the major powers, and one able to counterbalance American power as well as to come to Iran's defence. It also thinks that maintaining good economic relations with Beijing will enable Iran to bypass its assigned pariah status and in that way attract other foreign investments. However, nothing is less certain.
54 Chinese investments, so crucial for the hard-hit Iranian economy, would be less subject to coercion from the United States than those from European or Japanese companies. Indeed, the Iranian economy is not sufficiently strong to create enough jobs for the tens of thousands of young people entering the job market each year. Moreover, US sanctions have severely hit the Iranian oil industry, which has consequently been functioning with obsolete materials, some of them dating back to the s. In this regard, according to OPEC experts, 55 Iran oil production is expected to decline sharply within the next few years, unless as much as   billion is invested over the next  years or so.
56 Since Iran is very unlikely to get such aid from Western countries, China's support could be crucial to maintaining the flow of Iran's economy and oil industry.
However, with its strongly export-oriented economy, which tends to integrate China more and more into the neoliberal globalisation process, and despite the conflicting geopolitical context, Beijing is more inclined to accept Washington's predominance than to affirm its support to Tehran.
57 On the whole, Chinese policy in the Middle East depends on two key elements: () establishing multidimensional and friendly relationships with all the states of the region, whether they are pro or anti American; and () access to the resources of the region, namely the goods and capital export markets and, above all, the oil supply.
58 For these reasons, the stability of the region and its preservation are of the utmost interest for the Chinese.
59 Besides, it seems that, to a certain extent, they are ready to support the American action in the Middle East, albeit discreetly, since the various movements of US military forces, aimed at maintaining the stability of the region, can serve their own interests.
60
As far as the Iranian nuclear programme is concerned, China has tried to delay and mitigate American efforts against Tehran, yet without completely blocking them. us, it was in this context that in February  Beijing sent a very clear note inviting Tehran not to resume its activities of uranium enrichment. Iran's subsequent intransigence led China to accept the transfer, in March , of the Iranian nuclear dossier from the IAEA to the UN Security Council and to its vote in favour of Resolution  urging Iran to suspend its nuclear activities or face sanctions.
61 In this regard, although Hu Jintao, the Chinese president, acknowledged the right of Tehran to develop a civilian nuclear programme, he nevertheless urged the different Iranian officials he met in Beijing in June , including Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to respond positively and with flexibility to the US, EU and Russian offer for the resolution of the Iranian nuclear dossier.
62 In his statement, President Hu Jintao informed the Iranians of 'the shared concern' he considered 'legitimate' of the major powers on that dossier. Moreover, stressing the unanimous vote of the UN resolution, he advised Iran to make 'serious responses' to the requests of the international community.
63
As a matter of fact, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran is not at all in China's interests. Indeed, if that were the case then the risks of tension in the Middle East would lead to an increase in oil prices, which in turn would severely affect the Chinese economy. Neither would the risk that a bomb might be transferred to a terrorist group and used against a major power such as the US or China promote China's interests.
64 Finally, it is clear that Iran's acquisition of such armaments would in no way allow the counterbalancing of American power in the region. 67 to the extent that whenever Washington asks China to end its support for Iran, China conditions its consent with the suspension of US support to Taiwan, i.e. the suspension of their arms transfers. erefore, and even though the issue of Taiwan, the rebel island Beijing wants to get back, is not clearly mentioned when China negotiates with the US on the Iranian issue, it is part of the global game that opposes both parties and on which China wishes to extract some advantage in the exchange of a 'comprehensive posture' on the Iranian nuclear crisis, the focal game led by the US. is was highlighted in February , when President Obama tried to get a UN vote on a new round of sanctions against Tehran. In this regard, to incite China's vote, it was then announced that the US would sell arms to the value of  . billion to Taiwan, including Patriot missiles and Black Hawk helicopters. China's answer was swift: less than a day after this announcement, Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei issued an official demarche to US Ambassador Jon Huntsman, saying: 'e sale constitutes a gross intervention into China's internal affairs, that seriously endangers China's national security … would definitely undermine bilateral relations and have a "serious negative impact" on future bilateral cooperation.' Later on, the Chinese government announced four major reactions, the third of which was 'to suspend their planned high level meeting on arms control, strategic security and non-proliferation'. Furthermore, without discounting any inherent rhetoric, we should not ignore the fact that China's real outrage was displayed in both the Chinese and the Western media. us, in such a 66) Douglas et al., Fueling the dragon's flame, p. . 67) John Garver's response to an email sent by the author in July . tense context, one must not overlook the statement of Huang Xiangyang, a Chinese journalist from the China Daily newspaper, stressing that: 'From now on a message has to be sent. From now on, the US shall not expect cooperation from China on a wide range of major regional and international issues. If you don't care about our interests, why should we care about yours?' 68 where 'yours' means North Korea and Iran.
In fact, Taiwan is a crucial issue in Chinese foreign policy, and in that sense it has a major influence on Sino-US relations in the Middle East. First, Beijing attempts to use American demands in the Persian Gulf as a pressure lever aimed at gaining US concessions on Taiwan.
69 Second, the perspective of a possible conflict with the US on the Taiwan question increases the need for China to have reliable allies in the Middle East who do not depend upon American support, and who therefore can provide her with oil. Yet, apart from Iran, no other country in the region would be willing to meet China's expectations.
70
With regard to Sino-US relations, the first time the Chinese linked their policy in Iran with the Taiwan question dates back to  September , when the US announced the sale of  F fighter aircraft to Taiwan.
71 For Beijing, this was a flagrant violation of the last joint communiqué, agreed by both countries in , regulating their relations on the Taiwan issue.
72
So, just after the US announcement of that sale to Taiwan, the Xinhua News (New China) Agency announced the arrival of an Iranian military delegation in Beijing for the negotiation of an arms deal.
73 At the same time, Liu Huaqiu, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that Beijing would not participate in discussions with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council on the question of arms transfers to the Middle East, unless Washington gave up its arms sales to Taiwan.
74 Finally, on  September , China signed an agreement with the Iranians regarding the sale and installation of several nuclear power plants in Iran. From this, it is clear that this contract, which had been in negotiation with Iran since , was signed as a result 68) Huang Xiangyang, 'Get back when attacked', China Daily ( January ). 69) John Garver's response to an email sent by the author in July . 70) John Garver's response to an email sent by the author in July . 71) Garver, China and Iran, p. . 72) is communiqué specified that, in compliance with the diplomatic relations established between China and the United States in , Washington should not sell arms to Taiwan exceeding in quality and in quantity those sold to Taipei prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States in . 73) Garver, China and Iran, p. . 74) Garver, China and Iran, p. . of the US announcement of arms sales to Taiwan.
75 Yet, as paradoxical as it may seem, less than two weeks later, on  September, this agreement was suspended for no apparent reason. Five years later, in , China justified its sales of missiles to Pakistan and Iran in the same way, as a sort of follow-up of the US sale of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Taiwan.
76 With regard to nuclear non-proliferation, Liu Huaqiu specified in a statement he made in  that 'a first step [for the resumption of negotiations on non-proliferation] consists in the suspension of the sale of fighter aircraft F to Taiwan'.
77 And this Chinese requirement continued even after China's final suspension, in , of the transfer of missiles to Iran. erefore, it is apparent that China has been using the Iranian card as a means of calculated though relatively limited pressure on the US to obtain concessions on the Taiwan issue. Yet it is clear that Beijing has never intended to break off its relations with Washington because of Iran. is explains China's decision, made at a high level, to suspend the  agreement on the nuclear power plant, and that of  on the transfer of missiles.
78 In fact, the Chinese felt it would be useless to add more tension to Sino-American relations, which had been already weakened by the Sino-Pakistani cooperation frowned upon by the Americans. In this regard, China had indeed until then always refused to yield to American pressure on that dossier, since it was a question of siding with Islamabad against its Indian enemy. Inversely, a hypothetical Iranian nuclear bomb might be directed against the US, a country which might be China's rival but is, above all, its key partner.
79
On its side, Washington has always integrated the Taiwan factor into its efforts to make Beijing yield to its demands. Indeed, in , when both countries were negotiating on the Iranian missiles, the Chinese asked the Americans to make official and put in writing the promise President Clinton had made in a letter to the Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, that the US would not support Taiwanese independence. 80 e US refused to comply with China's demand, although Clinton did make a declaration, at a press conference, to that effect.
81
A few years later, in April , President George W. Bush authorised arms sales to Taiwan worth several billion dollars, including  P 'Orion' anti-submarine aircraft, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, eight diesel-powered submarines and four Kidd-class destroyers.
82 Yet at that time Bush refused to sell Taiwan the ultra-sophisticated Aegis anti-missile defence system and PAC- air guided defence missiles.
83 Moreover, it is relevant to remember that the Kidd-class destroyers were built in the s for the shah of Iran, but were never delivered because of the Iranian revolution of  which overthrew Iran's monarchy.
84 Concerning the eight diesel-powered submarines, the sale contract was indeed signed. But it is here also worth noting that the US had not built conventional submarines since the s and therefore had none for sale at that time.
85 is was the reason for the weakness of China's protest. However, cooperation between Beijing and Washington was in no way affected by these sales. Indeed, this was unlike the situation in , when China did resume its arms sales to Iran.
Within the same context, in order to spare the sensibilities of Beijing following its recent ratification of the transfer of the Iranian nuclear dossier from the IAEA to the UN Security Council, as well as the sanctions against Iran, from  to  Bush refused to sell modernised F aircraft to Taipei, a refusal confirmed by Timothy Keating, the US Navy admiral, in July  at a forum in Washington, stating that the Bush administration had decided to freeze arms sales to Taiwan.
86
In October  the US announced an agreement to sell weapons to Taiwan for  . billion. However, it should be mentioned that the authorisation request, addressed to the US Congress and necessary to make the sale effective, did not include Taipei's demand for Black Hawk helicopters, nor its demand for submarines.
87 Besides, the sale of the PAC- missile-the world's most advanced air-defence missile-was significantly restricted.
88 Indeed, all this clearly reflected Washington's willingness to respect Beijing's sensibilities. Moreover, it is also interesting to underscore, on the one hand, that Admiral Keating had made his statement at the Washington forum in July , when new UN sanctions on Iran were underway, and, on the other hand, that the arms sales, made in October of the same year, occurred further to a prolonged standstill of the UN sanctions on Iran. Likewise, it is also relevant to highlight that, even if relations had been suspended in October  between the Chinese and US armies, China did not resume its arms sales cooperation on missile and/or nuclear weapons with Iran.
erefore, in spite of the insistence of the Americans, who repeatedly state that there is no connection between the Taiwanese and Middle East issues, it is clear that if the US wants China's support on the Iranian dossier, it will have no choice but to associate the two issues.
89 is is the reason Beijing uses the Iranian card as much as it can to advance its views on the Taiwanese question.
.. e Oil Issue
Since , China has become second only to the US as the world's largest oil importer, as well as being the world's second-largest oil consumer.
90 In this regard, in  China imported  per cent of its total consumption.
91 Moreover, it is quite clear that for the Chinese to sustain their economic development, their oil consumption should keep on rising. So, in that perspective, ensuring an adequate oil supply to its economy has become fundamental. It should also be kept in mind that, in ,  per cent of China's oil imports came from the Middle East, imports that will only increase in the years to come.
92
us, it is indeed the need for oil which largely determines Sino-Iranian relationships, in the knowledge that around  per cent of the Chinese oil supply came from Iran in . However, owing to the decrease in Iranian oil production, this figure declined to  per cent in , although it remains high. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Iran also has vast gas reserves, 89) Alterman and Garver, e Vital Triangle, p. . 90) Mahmoud Gharfouri, 'China's policy in the Persian Gulf ', Middle East Policy, Vol. , No.  (Summer ), p. . 91) Conference of Ambassador Tang Guoqiang, China's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the ird International Seminar of OPEC, 'China's energy situation and its future and the new energy security concept', Vienna, Austria ( September ). Online: http://www.opec.org/opecna/Speeches//OPEC_Seminar/PDF/ GuoqiangTang.pdf. 92) Delpech, L' Iran, p. . ranking worldwide just below those of Russia.
93 However, compared to that of other producing countries, Iranian current production is well below its potential capacity because of the lack of investment and modern technology in the hydrocarbon industry. If Iran could get foreign help for its modernisation, namely from the Chinese, it could then become China's largest partner in the energy sector. 94 In this regard, we should bear in mind that Iran is second only to Saudi Arabia in supplying China with oil.
95 Moreover, in  Iran agreed to invest   million in China in the oil-refining sector.
96 Finally and above all, in  Iran and China signed a memorandum of understanding which allows China to buy, for a period of  years, around  million tonnes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the Yadavaran oil field in southern Iran, a contract amounting to  - billion.
97 On its side, China agreed to participate in the modernisation of Iranian oil and gas facilities, particularly those on the shore of the Caspian Sea and in the nearby strategic region of Neka.
98
is explains Beijing's policy of 'accommodating' Tehran, mainly because, as seen above, energy supply security is quite a critical parameter in China's foreign policy, and because Iran has always been a reliable partner in that regard.
Yet the interpretation of China and Iran relationships has to be mitigated. For example, with regard to the huge contract of  -  billion which was signed in , according to an OPEC official: 'It is indeed an important contract, but it is not "the contract of the century", particularly in view of the Chinese consumption, which is far more important and which, undoubtedly, is going to increase further and further in the  years to come.' 99 Moreover, two elements of that contract should be highlighted. First, it seems that the ChinaIran rapprochement took place in a period when the crisis related to Iranian nuclear programme was intensifying and Iran was seeking to gain China's support in any way it could. Second, very few other investors were interested in this draft agreement. erefore, it was a commercial transaction rather than a political act.
100 Finally, we have to keep in mind that this is a memorandum and not a contract per se. In fact, the first contract, which covered the completion of the first tranche of this project, was signed in December  between SINOPEC, a major Chinese petroleum and chemical corporation, and NIOC, the National Iranian Oil Company, for   billion, a rather small figure. e reasons which led to the delay in the signing of this first contract, three years after the memorandum was signed, were in fact political. It was in fact the pressure caused by the Iranian nuclear dossier which slowed down the contract negotiations, as the Chinese had to wait for the publication in November  of the National Intelligence Estimate, confirming that Tehran had renounced its nuclear weapons programme. 101 ere is an even more problematic-but nonetheless good-indicator of this troubled cooperation in the oil realm: the China National Offshore Oil Corporation was about to sign a   billion memorandum of understanding with Iran in  when it was cancelled at the last minute, under the rather unconvincing pretext that the Iranian oil minister could not attend the ceremony.
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As a matter of fact, well before this China had been experiencing significant US pressure with regard to the contract. For Jeff Bader, a former official of the US National Security Council:
e Iranian nuclear crisis is a problem for the whole international community, for which it is rather important that China 'puts its feet in the dish' and shows its interest in the international stability by being very careful about this type of investments.
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At the same time, the Iranian ambassador in China did not fail to point out the significant American pressure exerted on Beijing in order to make China suspend its energy relationships with his country. As a matter of fact, most of China's oil companies have their subsidiaries on US stock exchange markets, which makes them vulnerable to Washington's pressures and sanctions.
104 We should also remember that the US severely punished the China Petro Corporation for importing oil from Sudan. erefore, should Beijing sign contracts with Iran and be represented by the Iranian leaders as a supporter of their regime, Chinese investments in Iran would still be constrained by a number of factors, limiting the full reality of these deals. us, even if it is true that the oil companies are gaining momentum in shaping China's foreign policy 105 and play a major role in Beijing's attitude towards Tehran, it is nonetheless also true that maintaining a complex but strategic relationship with Washington is even more important. Moreover, the resumption of negotiations between Iraq and China concerning a contract signed under the Saddam Hussein regime for the supply of Iraqi oil took a significant turn with the signature of the contract in October , 106 and another in  by which China was allowed to exploit Iraq's biggest oil field of Al-Ahdab.
Finally, it is also important to underline the very close ties between China and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Saudi Arabia is China's main oil supplier, and both countries have continued to grow closer during recent years. us, it is in this context that Saudi King Abdullah made his first visit to Beijing in January . His visit was followed by that of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Riyadh, three months later, although it should be noted that President Hu Jintao never paid an official visit to Iran. Both visits led to the conclusion of many agreements, which prompted many experts in the field to say that both countries were moving towards a strategic partnership.
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Before that, in , the Saudis signed a cooperation agreement with Beijing for the building of a  . billion new refinery in China.
108 Another contract was also signed for the construction of an oil storage centre with a capacity of  million barrels.
109 Moreover, in the same period Riyadh invited Chinese companies to participate in a development programme amounting to   billion.
110 In fact, the ongoing links between China and Saudi Arabia can be explained by two important elements: on the one hand () Saudi Arabia is one of the US's closest allies in the Middle East, and () it is completely opposed to the Iranian nuclear programme. On the other hand, so many contracts of such importance to the Chinese can only diminish Tehran's influence on Beijing, especially as trade relations with Iran represent only . per cent of the Chinese market.
111
erefore, if the energy issue is an important factor and a major challenge in relations about the Iranian dossier, it should be set at its fair value. Tehran is indeed an important partner for Beijing, but Sino-Saudi Arabian relations are far more important. Compared to this, Iranian oil has a rather limited influence on China, whereas China, which is Iran's second most important economic partner, can exert a very strong influence on Iran.
.. e Balance of Targeted and Reversible Sanctions
As a matter of fact, the Chinese are, beyond any reasonable doubt, against the development of a nuclear weapons programme in Iran, nuclear non-proliferation being a world norm underpinning international cooperation on collective security. Moreover, China wants to be regarded as a major 'must' agent in the present international world order, and able to be trusted with international responsibilities. us, if until the very beginning of the s it had remained outside the main agreements on international nuclear security, China has since then, particularly under American pressure, 112 joined practically all international treaties and agreements on non-proliferation.
113 And, although being subjected to stringent obligations, China has also signed a series of agreements with the US, 114 allowing its accession, in , to the NPT. Not only has this demonstrated China's awareness of the danger of nuclear proliferation for its own security, but it has also contributed to the image of a power with the capacity, just like others, to fulfil its responsibilities on the international stage.
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All this explains the reasons that led China to regularly support the initiatives aimed at preventing Iran from developing a nuclear programme: first through negotiations, and then by supporting the UN sanctions against Iran. To the question of an Iranian journalist to the Chinese Foreign Minister, asking if China was intending to veto the Security Council in the case of a sanction vote being passed against Iran, Li Zhao Xing answered: 'Veto cannot be used extensively. We should see if there is a basis to that orientation [the development of a nuclear weapon], and who has the prerogative to do so. in fact a diplomatic way of saying that the Chinese vote would depend not only on the existing proof of a development of WMD by Iran, but also on the attitude of the other permanent members of the Security Council on the matter. On the other hand, Beijing has a lot of strategic and economic interests weighing upon its relations with the US, among which are Taiwan and the energy issues. Indeed, between  and , taking advantage of the stalled situation, China signed several multi-billion-dollar contracts with Iran in the realm of the oil industry. Although China has a long history of signing contracts without implementing them afterwards, it is nonetheless true that Iran is one of the most important oil suppliers for Beijing, Saudi Arabia being the most important. At the same time, Beijing is aware that a nuclear-armed Iran would increase uncertainties and tensions in the region, resulting in a dramatic increase in oil prices that could hurt China's economic growth, which is heavily dependent on Middle East oil imports.
117 Moreover, international sanctions could also negatively affect the billion-dollar investments China has in Iran, not only in the oil sector but also in other sectors of the Iranian economy.
And, as we have seen above, Washington is completely aware of this. us, in spite of its good relations with Taiwan, the US has always refused to support Taiwan's desire for independence in order to avoid upsetting China. Moreover, the US supplies Taiwan with limited quantities of arms compared to Taipei's requests. For Beijing's part, even if Iranian oil represents only  per cent of its supplies in terms of energy, Tehran is still a very important partner for China. But it is not the only one in the region. As a matter of fact, the Chinese are more dependent on the US's Arab allies in the Middle East and are therefore more vulnerable to American pressure. In this sense, taking into account China's desire to maintain good relations with the US, many specialists on the question think that American support for the strengthening of China's economic presence in Iraq, particularly in the Al-Ahdab oil field, as well as for the broadening and deepening of Beijing's relations with Riyadh, would help the US achieve a more understanding attitude from the Chinese on the Iranian nuclear issue. At some point, it was even suggested that to offset an oil price rise, Saudi Arabia could sell its oil to China at a favourable price, so as to avoid any impact of UN sanctions on the Chinese economy. report their travels.
120 Resolution  121 also extended the freezing of assets to Pasdaran, Iran's Revolutionary Guards.
Furthermore, a strong warning was issued to Iranian financial circles with the de facto exclusion of Bank Sepah, the fourth most important bank in Iran, from making any transactions within the international financial system. In March , after lengthy negotiations between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Resolution  122 was adopted, imposing a third set of sanctions against Iran, far more severe than the first two imposed by Resolutions  and . is third resolution extended the black list of individuals and entities once again, forbidding the sale of nuclear dualuse goods to Iran while authorising the inspection of any suspected cargo, aircraft or vessel to and from Iran. It also called upon all UN countries to exercise vigilance over their financial transactions with the Iranian banks. It should be underlined that the addition to the black list of Saderat and Melli, two banks of crucial importance for Iran, is a quite significant aspect of this resolution. Finally, what is less well known but not less important is that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany ( + ) have also exerted enormous pressure on Tehran through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 123 an inter-governmental body based in Paris and composed of  member countries, among which are the  +  (France, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and the United States, plus Germany), whose task is to prevent money-laundering and terrorist financing. In this regard, from October  to February  FATF had been constantly urging its member countries to require extreme vigilance from their financial institutions in their relations with Iran. ey were also instructed to take the necessary measures to fight Iranian illicit financial operations, namely those of their 'front companies' involved in WMD proliferation. 124 In that same context, in  the Parisbased Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), composed of  countries including France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany (and in the process of integrating many other countries, among them China and Russia) upgraded Iran to level  (on a scale of ) among the countries at risk for business:
125 indeed, a very penalising classification for the Iranian economy.
e full support of Moscow and especially Beijing to these two resolutions were felt as a slap by the Iranian regime. Indeed, President Ahmadinejad himself had strongly asserted that neither Russia nor China would ever vote for sanctions against Iran 126 and that they would bar any such UN resolution. erefore, the Chinese and Russian shift caused a great shock wave among the Iranian managerial and professional ruling class, who for the first time felt completely isolated on both the diplomatic and economic level. 
Conclusion
So, by giving Beijing guarantees on Taiwan between  and , by ensuring the security of China's oil supplies and by choosing targeted and reversible sanctions against proliferation, the US has succeeded in gaining China's cooperation on the Iranian issue. However, the recent decision of American President Obama to sell weapons to Taiwan, without being a priori inconsistent with that conflicting cooperation, has nevertheless slowed down its process. Yet China's cooperation is not completely suspended, since Beijing is still taking part in the negotiations on Iran and still condemns Tehran's nuclear military activities. Indeed, when Obama made the final decision to sell modernised weapons to Taiwan, it was decided not to sell a new range of F aircraft, but rather to modernise those sold in the early s. In fact, it is a calculated half-measure. It allows the US administration to keep close relations with Taiwan, while at the same time maintaining a strategic relationship with Beijing, however complex. Indeed, selling advanced F aircraft to Taiwan, added to the other weapons sales, could have tilted the regional balance of power in the Taiwan Strait in favour of Taipei, and further complicated Beijing cooperation with the US on Iran. As a matter of fact, the Chinese are well aware that a nuclear Iran could eventually destabilise the Middle East and push up oil prices, which in turn would negatively impact their own economic growth. So it is in China's interest to take as much advantage as possible of Iran's crisis but without letting Iran develop a nuclear weapon, and to that aim it should keep on acting within the context of cooperation, albeit conflicting, of the multi-level game theory. In this context, the US-China tensions resulting from this arms sale to Taiwan could be viewed as a momentary downturn, as it is not to the long-term mutual benefit of either country to be confrontational. e US and China have much to win by focusing on their respective domestic agendas while, at the same time, working at the international level to address pressing challenges. us, within the inevitable but limited ups and downs of this interactionism perspective, relations between the Americans and the Chinese are likely to settle to a new equilibrium.
